I have no
idea what Trump understands or does not understand. Unlike many people online I
do not consider him to be as dumb as is often claimed by some, nor as brilliant
as is often claimed by others. For a long time he had good instincts about how
to get support from a broad base in society. He has shown good instincts on
domestic policy, and even some of his international excursions have worked out
better than some predicted they would. But I think the old adage, “the seeds of
defeat are sown in victory” apply to this situation with Iran. Things he had
done well have caused him to over extend and land the US in a much more difficult
situation.
With
Venezuela he got away with a bold and, in the modern mind, unique style of
strike. It was not as unique as some think, if you read the Old Testament there
are very similar actions taken by other nations. For instance, at one point
both Syria and Samaria plot to take out the leader of Judah, so that they can
get Judah on board with their foreign policy (Isa. 7:1-9). However, in the
context of recent US foreign policy it was quite unique, and the quickness with
which Venezuelan ships started taking their oil where the US and its allies
would prefer, really even got many critics to support the actions after the
fact. But it has caused his most avid supporters to overestimate his abilities.
Iran has
proven a much harder nut to crack. There are various reasons for this. The
ancient nature of their society. The fact that for decades now they have forged
a relatively successful economy under sanctions. The ideological nature of
their leadership which makes it far more impervious to pressure. The distance
from the US to the Middle East. Iran’s placement in the world trade system and
its ability to turn around and put sanctions on the much of the world in
response to attacks. The US’s intricate relationship with Israel, which makes
it harder for the US to act completely in its own interests (though I suspect
this relationship is being strained by this conflict). And various other
factors make this situation much harder to handle. But there is also one other,
very significant reason why this nut is much harder to crack.
Trump’s
policies towards Iran are accelerating the very fracturing of the world trade
system that many of his supporters argue that he was seeking to protect with
this war. Some argue he was really seeking to address the city of London’s hold
on global trade through ancient legal structures, and remove the United States
from under the sway of these influences. There may even be some solid reasons
to agree with this analysis. The problem is that the city of London’s hold on
trade was already declining, because as many analysts have observed, the world
is bifurcating into an economic zone centred in Asia which includes China, its
allies and its satellites, and another zone which includes much of the
historical west led by the USA, along with its allies and satellites, this is where the city of London still has power as well. In other
words, if the city of London and the Trump administration were competing, they
were competing over and already shrinking influence.
This is the
part of the analysis many people are not factoring in. They think it is Trump
verse the globalists. Others think Trump has been co-opted by the globalists. But
there is no reason to be so binary about how world power works, there are
clearly many factions and centres of power, and they are competing with each
other. The Western centres of power are increasingly losing their dominance.
This can be
seen in different ways, but one of the core ways is how nations on the Asian
continent are increasingly seeking to build more land trade routes. I touched
on this as being one of the real reasons behind Israel and the US’s attack on
Iran back in June 2025,
“Iran
is succeeding to grow its economy, and it is succeeding in a way that it should
not be under some of the harshest sanctions in the world. It is succeeding in a
way that presents a challenge to the US dominance of the world economy, and the
US/Israeli dominance of the Middle East.
You
have probably heard of the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative? This is China’s
attempt to create a trade network all across the world, with interlocking
infrastructure to increase China’s trade power in many regions of the world.
But did you know how closely China is working with Iran to achieve this trade
dominance in the Eurasia? China and Iran have jointly created a successful
China-Iran railway corridor, and guess what, it just went operational,
“On
May 25, 2025, the first freight train from Xi’an, China, arrived at the Aprin
dry port, Iran, marking the official launch of a direct rail link between the
two countries. This new logistical artery significantly reduces transit times
(from 30–40 days by sea to roughly 15 days by land) yielding a direct impact on
transportation costs.”[1]
This
railway is part of a much larger and broader East-West Corridor that is
designed to link China, physically, with a trade route directly to Africa, and
to Europe, without having to use the more traditional sea trade routes. Think
of it as a new railway-based silk road, the very concept that China implemented
in the past to make itself an economic powerhouse is previous eras.”[1]
The United
States, along with Britain before it, and France and Holland before that, built
their wealth and their power around being sea powers. This is one of the
reasons that after World War 2 the dominance of the world system moved so
readily towards the United States. During the war America had so focused on sea
power to crush Japan, that its navy remained unquestionably the dominant navy.
The Soviet Union had the chance to do what China is now doing and turn its
place on the Eurasian continent into a power that could bypass US controlled
sea lanes, but the corrosive nature of communism made it quickly collapse from
within. However, China is a much more resilient nation, has learnt from the
mistakes of the Soviets, and is seeking to build its influence in a much slower
and methodical way, while the US galivants around the world using a combination
of force, threat of force and economic warfare to harangue everybody to stay in
line. However, this influence is waning, as wealth concentrates in Asia.
This war is
quickening the rise of the Eurasian continent, emphasis on Asia, and now
Pakistan is following the approach of China. As Simplicius notes,
“From
the above—Pakistan has created “an overland sanctions-resilient corridor [to
Iran] capable of reshaping regional trade geometry”:
Pakistan’s
decision to formally open its territory for third-country goods bound for Iran
marks far more than a customs adjustment, because it inserts Islamabad directly
into one of the most strategically sensitive logistics contests now unfolding
across the Middle East and the northern Arabian Sea.
At
a moment when the Strait of Hormuz faces severe disruption, Iranian ports
remain under intense maritime pressure, and more than 3,000 Iran-bound
containers are stranded at Karachi, Pakistan has effectively created an
overland sanctions-resilient corridor capable of reshaping regional trade
geometry.
By
activating Gwadar, Karachi, Port Qasim, Taftan, Gabd, Quetta, Khuzdar and
Ormara as integrated transit nodes, Islamabad is not merely facilitating
commerce but redefining force posture, strategic access, and geopolitical
leverage between Washington, Tehran, Beijing, and the wider Indo-Pacific
maritime system.”[2]
Pakistan is taking
the opportunity this war presents to restructure how it trades with Iran
through land routes. This is the kind of situation that sea powers fear, one
where land-based powers can simply ignore them, or largely work around their
influence and power. Britain worked hard for centuries to support rising powers
in Europe to challenge the dominant land powers, in an effort to stop any one continental
power becoming too dominant. This policy eventually culminated in two of the
worst wars in history, WW1 and WW2, where the size and power of the British
Empire drew most of the world into their final two attempts to maintain their
dominance. World War 1 was indecisive, and World War 2 ended with Britain in
steep debt and then decline and the US, a sea power, and the Soviet Union, a
land power, squaring off for dominance of the world system.
While the US
was dominant over the West for much of that time, it really only became the
true singular world power when the Berlin wall fell, and with it the Soviet
empire. But rather than maintain order and stability, the US has engaged in
foreign war after foreign in the Middle East severely weakening its prestige in
the world, and incentivising the switch to land based trade in the Eurasian
continent. In other words, Trump’s efforts to stop what is happening are
accelerating the bifurcation of the world system. He may have intended to fight a different type of war, but the Middle East is not known as an ancient quagmire for empires for no reason.
Even Ukraine
can be seen as part of this trend. Prior to the Ukraine war Europe’s dependence
on Russian resources was increasing, and this would have concerned the powers
that reside in Washington. Most of the world, and most of the wealth of the
World is concentrated in Europe and Asia. If that continental block was able to
draw together, they would be able to exchange wealth and grow prosperous
without any real need for US naval power or influence. Empires do not like
seeing themselves become obsolete.
It is for
reasons like this that I analyse the Iran war through the lens of collapsing US
dominance and growing Asan dominance. Or in other worlds, through the
historical lens of the rise and fall of empires. The sad thing is the rise of
Asia came about as a direct result of Anglo-American free trade policies that
moved technology and industry to that region. And now, whether he knows it or
not, Trump’s policies are accelerating the very thing that Anglo-American
powers have sought to avoid for centuries: a European/Asian trade network which
they cannot dominate. I do not see them letting this happen without fighting
hard to stop it, therefore, we can conclude that there are worse wars to come.
List of
References
